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CORPORATE DARWINISM: DISCIPLINING
MANAGERS IN A WORLD WITH WEAK
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION*
JAMES D. COX** & RANDALL S. THOMAS***
Because representative shareholder litigation has been
constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate
governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative
means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent
significant governance developments in the corporate world are
the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of
shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency
costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve
to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to
monitor and discipline corporate managers.
We further claim that these new governance responses are
themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising
concentration of share ownership of public companies. Share
ownership has steadily evolved so that there are now a significant
number of large blockholders at most public companies. This
growing concentration of ownership in public companies has the
twin effects of reducing the costs of collective action and
increasing the likelihood that an owner exists who will have a
sufficient economic interest to embrace improved governance as
a wealth-increasing strategy.
Finally, the increasing concentration of ownership of public
companies has the effect of making governance responses
efficient and effective, a response that would not have been
observed were ownership not concentrated. Thus, we not only
argue that concentration increases activism among this growing
group of blockholders but also that concentrated ownership
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate legal scholarship is riveted on addressing managerial
agency costs.1 Adolf Berle and Gardner Means popularized the topic
by documenting how in the 1930s the ownership of U.S. public
companies was separated from management, resulting in a
misalignment of utility curves between owners and managers.2

1. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288, 289 (1980) (explaining how the “separation of security ownership and control”
functions as “an efficient form of economic organization”); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233, 234 (1979) (affirming the centrality of transaction costs to economics and providing an
in-depth analysis of them).
2. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66, 112–13 (1932) (explaining that the typical public corporate
owners were dispersed so that owners’ exercise of oversight was seriously limited by high
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Michael Jensen and William Meckling later showed that within
dispersed ownership systems, shareholders engage in a variety of
strategies so as to minimize these divergences.3 In pursuit of this goal,
shareholders may deploy a variety of mechanisms—shareholder
voting, the threat of a change-of-control transaction, or performancebased compensation—to encourage managers to succeed and punish
managers who are poor stewards and fail to enhance shareholder
value.4 Over time, the relative value of these different devices for
disciplining managers has ebbed and flowed with the changes in share
ownership patterns and the constant evolution in legal rules, both
substantive and procedural.5
As part of this paradigm, legal scholars regularly examine how
effectively representative litigation, whether class actions or
derivative suits, controls managerial agency costs.6 Many scholars
argue that over the past seventy years shareholder representative
litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial
abuses at U.S. public companies.7 Different types of representative
litigation have had their moment in the sun—derivative suits early on,
followed by federal securities class actions, and, most recently, merger

coordination costs, which enabled managers to essentially hire capital rather than capital
to retain managers).
3. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323–24 (1976). The
article sets forth the classic framework for considering multiple efficient responses to
agency costs. See id. at 305–06.
4. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1531–32
(2007).
5. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1753, 1758–60 (2012).
6. For an example of a positive view of the efficiency of shareholder suits in
addressing agency costs, see James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745, 775–76 (1984).
But see Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 277–83 (1986) (concluding that derivative stockholder suits do not have a
significant effect on shareholder wealth); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84–85 (1991) (concluding that
shareholder litigation is a weak and ineffective tool of corporate governance).
7. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder
Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S.
Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164, 164–65 (2009); Robert B. Thompson
& Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2004); see C.N.V. Krishnan et al.,
Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1249 (2012).
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litigation—which often produce benefits for shareholders but pose
difficult challenges as well.8
In particular, the benefits created by these suits are qualified by
the litigation agency costs that surround them.9 Litigation agency
costs arise because suits are often brought by a named plaintiff that
has no substantial ownership interest in the corporation. As a result,
the initiation and maintenance of these suits could be easily seen as
lawyer driven.10 And that perception is further underscored in the
United States where the “American rule,” in contrast to the “English
rule,” provides no governor on the suit’s initiation and prosecution.11
In recent years, concerns about the combination of the English rule
and litigation agency costs have resulted in legislative and judicial
actions that restrict shareholder litigation in many ways.
Our thesis is straightforward: we claim that the recent arrival of
significant governance developments is a natural consequence of both
the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address
certain genres of managerial agency costs. That is, just as one part of a
balloon expands when another part contracts, we reason that
governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the
decompression of shareholder monitoring in areas where it was once
supplied by private suits. In other words, as representative
shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal
developments, the corporate governance system has developed new
mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs.
In addition, we take this argument one step further: we claim
that these new governance responses are themselves becoming
stronger due in part to the rising concentration of share ownership of
public companies. Decades after Berle and Means aroused attention
to the presence and ills of the separation of ownership from
8. See generally Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder
Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089 (2013) (examining professional plaintiffs in shareholder
litigation and providing a proposed framework to address the problem professional
plaintiffs bring to shareholder litigation).
9. There is robust literature on exploring how and why the representative suit
counsel’s incentives are poorly aligned with the interests of the corporation or its
shareholders. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 23.
10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679–81 (1986); Ralph K. Winter, Paying
Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in
America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948–49 (1993).
11. For a more complete exploration of these differences in a multi-country setting,
see generally Symposium, Shareholder Suits, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 161 (2009).
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management, share ownership has steadily evolved so that there are
now a significant number of large blockholders at most public
companies.12 This growing concentration of ownership in public
companies has the twin effects of reducing the costs of collective
action and increasing the likelihood that an owner exists who will
have a sufficient economic interest to embrace improved governance
as a wealth-increasing strategy. Also, the increasing concentration of
ownership of public companies has the consequential effect of making
governance responses efficient and effective where the response
would not have been observed were ownership not concentrated.
Thus, we not only argue that concentration increases activism among
this growing group of blockholders but also that concentrated
ownership ushers in new methods to address agency costs.
Activist hedge funds are among the most obvious manifestation
of developments that have changed ownership of U.S. public
companies and reduced managerial agency costs. They have filled a
gap left by the closing of the market for corporate control and the
weakness of acquisition-oriented class actions.13 Hedge funds control
large pools of unregulated capital and aggressively invest in
underperforming target companies seeking to bring about stock price
increases.14 Hedge funds have assumed a role of “governance
intermediaries” as they develop and present choices for more docile
institutional holders who can become supporters but are rarely
initiators.15 Institutional investors are informed by their independent
third-party proxy advisors on initiatives teed up by the activist hedge
fund. Hence, in combination, the hedge funds and institutions have
pushed and shoved to get reluctant managers to take shareholder
value-maximizing actions and compensate for the slack left by weak
representative litigation. Using their voting strength, activist hedge
funds have gained board representation where they act as monitors of
12. Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22
REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1379 (2009). This activism is further facilitated by private equity
firms’ ownership consolidation. See infra Section III.C.
13. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1018–19 (2014).
14. See id. at 1019, 1034.
15. See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder
Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2014); Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013)
(demonstrating how activist hedge funds are desirable complements to the tendency of
financial institutions to be “rationally reticent”). For a close review of the multiple effects
of hedge fund activism, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755–73 (2008).
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management; reduce executive compensation; force sales, spinoffs, or
financial restructurings; or prompt other strategies to improve
operating performance.16 Alongside these hedge funds, private equity
firms assist them in their efforts and act as strong managerial
monitors as well by introducing strong risk management systems,
among other things.17
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act further armed investors, both large and
small, by mandating a non-binding say-on-pay vote (“Say on Pay”).18
This new vote on executives’ pay fills a corporate governance hole
created by the failure of derivative suits to regulate compensation;
Say on Pay resolutions enable shareholders, especially small
institutional shareholders, to engage in direct monitoring of executive
compensation.19 While its effectiveness as a check on executive pay is
still being studied, it has undoubtedly triggered a greater level of
engagement between corporate directors and shareholders on
compensation issues. It should not be overlooked that such
engagements are facilitated by, if not the direct result of, the rising
concentration of share ownership in the hands of institutional
investors.
This Article also considers the rising role of the appraisal remedy
within the context of developments in shareholder litigation focused
on acquisitions. The appraisal proceeding, an old and previously
largely defunct form of litigation, has been resuscitated by a few
hedge fund investment groups, who have begun filing these actions in
efforts to engage in what some have called “appraisal arbitrage.”20 As
16. See Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08
/09/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6TX5-6NF7].
17. Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth?
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 219, 220 (2009); see also Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2014/11/06/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/ [https://perma.cc/49DG-DSE6].
18. Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2015); see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
19. See Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Russ Wermers, Which Shareholders Benefit from
Low-Cost Monitoring Opportunities? Evidence from Say on Pay 1–2 (Robert H. Smith
Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. RHS 2510442, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2510442 [https://perma.cc/ZZ3U-4AU3 (staff-uploaded archive)].
20. See Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP (May 2007), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1883_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W6GZ-UV4A].
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discussed later, although shareholders seeking protection through the
appraisal remedy must overcome many hurdles to employ appraisal
as a meaningful alternative to merger litigation, as these suits are
sometimes subject to abuse, appraisal has the potential to become an
important monitoring mechanism.
Though multiple evolving governance mechanisms already
address managerial agency costs, there nonetheless seems to be a new
litigation approach to address lapses in managerial stewardship as
well. Failures of managerial oversight with regard to product safety,
operating risks, and compliance with the law may be addressed using
securities fraud class actions after the Supreme Court’s most recent
antifraud decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council
Construction Industry Pension Fund.21 As developed below, private
enforcement actions building on Omnicare have the potential to
police executives reporting to investors about their management
oversight efforts. These instances will certainly occur when boards or
senior officers provide optimistic assessments of their compliance
systems that are materially incomplete in their reassurances. The
resulting false representations respecting strength of internal systems
and false images of board oversight can be disciplined based on the
holding in Omnicare. Consequently, the possibility of such suits can
be expected to promote greater attention to stewardship by managers
who will take their oversight more seriously so as to avoid later
charges that they falsely represented their oversight.
We conclude that each one of these new or revived monitoring
techniques may be able to stand in for acquisition-oriented and
derivative shareholder litigation to ensure that managerial agency
costs are kept low. This Article proceeds as follows. Part I focuses on
the breakdown of acquisition-oriented class actions and their
potential replacement as a shareholder-monitoring device by activist
hedge funds and appraisal arbitrage. Next, Part II exposes the
weakness of derivative suit litigation as a check on excessive
executive compensation arrangements and the potential for Say on
Pay votes and hedge fund activism to supplant it as a shareholdermonitoring device. Finally, Part III discusses how derivative litigation
has done little to ensure that managers and boards engage in
appropriate levels of oversight activities. We then argue that after
Omnicare, this function may be taken over by the federal securities
laws and, to a smaller extent, private equity firms acting as monitors

21. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
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of internal control systems. We conclude with a summary and some
policy suggestions.
I. ACQUISITION-ORIENTED CLASS ACTIONS AND NEW
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
During the past seventy years, there have been many shifts
among the multiple types of shareholder litigation. Despite these ebbs
and flows, the business community shares the common view that
shareholder litigation is vexatious, robust, and expanding.22 This
perspective is partly justified, at least with respect to litigation
spawned by acquisitions in light of the recent dramatic frequency of
such deal-related litigation. This Part sets forth the significant
substantive and procedural changes that have adversely affected
shareholder acquisition-oriented class actions in the United States.
We then argue that these developments have prompted other
governance techniques to move into areas where shareholder
litigation formerly was the primary mechanism for limiting
managerial agency costs.
A. Shareholder M&A Class Actions
Delaware jurisprudence has for some time placed a bright
bullseye on M&A transactions, inviting shareholder-initiated court
challenges. The initial development in this area facilitated
shareholder suits aimed at self-dealing acquisitions, such as where a
cash-out merger occurs with the controlling stockholder.23 Close
judicial review was later extended to multi-step acquisitions with a
dominant stockholder.24 In such transactions, the Delaware courts
often placed the burden of proving entire fairness of the transaction
on the dominant stockholder.25 Moreover, heightened scrutiny is
extended in situations of any sale of control to a third party, placing
the burden on management to prove it acted reasonably to get the
22. See Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Poised to Embrace Appraisal Arbitrage, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/03/09/delawarepoised-to-embrace-appraisal-arbitrage/ [https://perma.cc/34ZC-N2HF].
23. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
24. See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 424–25 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(holding that a controlling stockholder who raises ownership interest to a level sufficient
to carry out a short-form merger via a tender offer must establish (1) entire fairness in the
resulting merger, unless such merger is consummated on the same terms as the preceding
tender offer; (2) the overall transaction is conditioned on a non-waivable plebiscite of a
majority of the independent shareholders; and (3) there are no accompanying retributive
threats).
25. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
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best offer.26 And should the target of another firm’s ardor take steps
to rebuff the bidder’s overture, Delaware subjects those defensive
actions to heightened scrutiny.27 Knitting each of these doctrines
together is the Delaware courts’ belief that the significance of the
transaction to the shareholders and, in some instances, the prospect of
director self-interest present an appealing case to lift the otherwise
strong presumption of independence and director good faith so that a
fulsome inquiry of the overall fairness of a transaction can be
judicially conducted.
By targeting such transactions for closer scrutiny, judicial
doctrine has had the natural effect of attracting litigation. Indeed,
litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is now
of epidemic proportions and overwhelmingly arises in the form of
class actions, as opposed to derivative suits.28 Generally, multiple suits
are filed very quickly after the announcement of a transaction;
counsel in such suits are usually law firms with a rich history of
engaging in such litigation.29 Data regarding such suits in an earlier
time show that those suits challenged primarily deals in which
managers had a conflict of interest, the suits tended to produce cash
settlements, and the cases did not exhibit the same degree of litigation
agency costs that were commonly believed to accompany other
representative suits.30 Thus, from 1999–2000 only 10.31% of deals
were litigated; most of such litigation focused on Delaware
companies, and the suits were maintained in Delaware.31
Furthermore, this litigation decreased the likelihood of a deal closing
but also increased the returns on the deals that did close. Overall, this
litigation was associated with an increased return for target firm
shareholders.32
Much of this has since changed dramatically so that today almost
all deals attract suits.33 Matthew Cain and Steven Davidoff report that
in 2012 there were 121 transactions over $100 million in value and

26. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986) (first case to extend heightened scrutiny); see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 1994) (clarifying the extension of heightened
scrutiny).
27. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995),
modifying Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
28. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 7, at 137.
29. Id. at 138.
30. See id. at 172 tbl.4.
31. Krishnan et al., supra note 7, at 1253, 1254 tbl.1.
32. Id. at 1250.
33. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1781.
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that 111 of these deals experienced deal litigation.34 Roughly 50% of
these 111 deals also resulted in litigation in more than one
jurisdiction.35 While several commentators have opined on the
underlying causes for these developments,36 we observe that these
developments have occurred while the number of securities class
actions and their lawyers have declined.37 While causation is always
difficult to prove, we surmise that the rapid rise in transactionoriented litigation could, at least in part, reflect many plaintifforiented law firms redirecting their foci away from the once-booming
securities fraud litigation that has now contracted.38
Just as too much fudge can be a problem, too warm an invitation
to challenge transactions and an ensuing response to challenge
common transactions creates its list of problems. One of the more
apparent problems derives from a host of concerns that flow from
multi-forum litigation focused on a single transaction. At a minimum,
several suits challenging the same deal in various forums may levy
non-trivial costs on the involved corporations. Even when all suits are
within the same state, litigation costs might be magnified, as there
invariably will be the question of what impact the resolution of the
dispute in one forum will have on another forum. To be sure, when
suits are within a single jurisdiction, courts can, as is the case in
Delaware, invoke the simplifying heuristics of the first-to-file rule to
address the competing claims of different parties.39 However, when
litigation straddles two or more jurisdictions, such an easy-toadminister approach is not available. When a suit spans two or more

34. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2
(Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, Pub. Law Legal Theory Working Paper Series &
Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 236, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377001 [https://perma.cc/MZS2-W3UQ (staffuploaded archive)].
35. See id. at 2 tbl.A.
36. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing its Cases?,
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 634 (2012); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav,
The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1069–70 (2013);
Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1794–99.
37. For an extensive discussion of the differences between securities fraud class
actions and M&A deal class actions, see Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1773–84.
38. See id. at 1776–78.
39. In a thoughtful analysis of the problems posed by such multi-forum litigation,
Professor George Geis argues that the preferred solution is forum selection bylaws,
discussed later in this Section. See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and
the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. L. REV. 261, 298–99 (2014). Where the firm does not
have such a provision, he suggests the outcome be guided by the court’s assessment of the
adequacy of counsel. Id. at 306. Professor Geis also recommends more vigorous
application of statutory authority to assign costs for ill-conceived suits. Id. at 309.
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sovereigns, comity among competing courts is possible, but such
coordination involves costly and time-consuming one-off discussions
among the involved courts, for which the outcome is less than
certain.40 Moreover, uncertainty regarding which suit will be deemed
40. A sobering lesson to be drawn from the explosion of multi-forum litigation is
illustrated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Pyott v. Louisiana Municipal Police
Employees’ Retirement System, 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013), where derivative suits were filed
in the District Court for the Central District of California and Delaware Chancery Court
following Allergan’s guilty plea and payment of a $600 million fine for having actively
marketed off-label uses of its blockbuster drug, Botox. Id. at 615. Despite the fact that the
case was proceeding on an expedited discovery calendar in Delaware, the California
federal court acted first. In In re Allergan, Inc., Shareholder Derivative Litigation, No.
SACV 10-01352 DOC (MLGx), 2011 WL 1429626 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2011), the federal
district court dismissed the derivative suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege
sufficient facts to excuse a demand on the board of directors under governing Delaware
precedents. Id. at *5. Thereupon, the defendants moved to dismiss the Delaware suit,
arguing that through the application of collateral estoppel, the Delaware suit could not
continue because the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution required a dismissal.
La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 316, 324 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2012). In an
extensive review of the governing law and the factual allegations set forth in the
complaint, Vice Chancellor Laster refused to dismiss the case. Id. at 316.
Vice Chancellor Laster reasoned that preclusion on the basis of collateral estoppel
required privity between the litigants. Id. at 324. While privity exists in contemporaneous
derivative suits, even though different plaintiffs initiated the suits, Vice Chancellor Laster
held that under Delaware precedent, because of the plaintiffs’ failure to show that demand
was excused whereby the plaintiffs could be deemed the legal representatives for the
corporation’s suit, privity does not exist when the suit has been dismissed because demand
was neither made nor excused. Id. at 334–35. An independent basis for holding that the
Delaware suit was not collaterally estopped was his belief that the plaintiffs in the
California suit were not adequate representatives. Id. at 335. The basis for this conclusion
was that the California suit’s plaintiffs were represented by what Vice Chancellor Laster
described as a fast-filing “specialized plaintiff’s firm” that customarily files suits on a
contingency fee basis. Id. at 336. The opinion did not mention that the action before him
was being prosecuted by a firm that also fit this profile. Much of the opinion on this issue
is directed to reviewing the problems that flow from the first-to-file rule, most significantly
prompting hasty filings of ill-conceived suits, concluding that “[b]y leaping to litigate
without first conducting a meaningful investigation, the California plaintiffs’ firms failed to
fulfill the fiduciary duties they voluntarily assumed as derivative action plaintiffs.” Id. at
350. The court thus concluded that preclusion was not in order since the earlier action
failed to provide adequate representation for Allergan. Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed on both points. See Pyott, 74 A.3d at 614.
The court held that California, and not Delaware, law should determine whether privity is
lacking due to the derivative suit’s dismissal for the failure to excuse demand on the board
of directors. Id. at 616. It concluded that under California law, contrary to the approach in
Delaware, privity is satisfied even though the suit is dismissed for failure to excuse a
demand. Id. at 616–17. The court also held that the irrebuttable presumption that fastfilers are inadequate representatives was not justified, which led to the court’s conclusion
that the prior suit did not preclude the Delaware suit. Id. at 618.
A close review of the two opinions supports the view that the complaint before
the Delaware court was far more detailed in supporting the central allegations of an
oversight claim, like the one in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), than was set forth in the complaint before the federal district
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the lead one undercuts plaintiffs’ counsels’ incentive to be heavily
invested in it. This is due in part to the concern that their efforts in
developing the case will prove unrewarded if their suit does not
become the lead suit.41
Further eroding counsels’ incentive to invest heavily in an
atmosphere of multi-forum litigation is the lurking fear of the reverse
auction. With the reverse auction, unscrupulous plaintiffs’ (and
defendants’) counsel advance their own financial interests by entering
into a global settlement that greatly undervalues the injury suffered
by the class shareholders.42 The reverse auction not only weakens the
compensatory function of shareholder suits but also, by providing
relief cheapened by the attorney’s self-interest, weakens the
deterrence value of the suit.

court. As such, there was a substantial basis to support Vice Chancellor Laster’s
conclusion that sufficient facts were alleged to support reasonable inferences that the
directors and officers of Allergan expected to garner increased sales by active promotion
of off-label uses of Botox. Pyott, 46 A.3d at 357. Of note is that the difference is not with
the judge but the quality of the derivative suit counsel. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the
Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 122, 148–49
(2016).
The difference between the two courts is not a dispute over doctrine. It is a
dispute over whether facts violate a doctrine, namely the fiduciary obligation of officers
and directors not to knowingly violate a criminal statute. And there is no reason to believe
that if the federal district judge had the Delaware complaint before him, his decision
would have been different from that reached by Vice Chancellor Laster. Ultimately, any
difference in zealousness between plaintiffs’ counsel in the California federal court and the
Delaware court was addressed by the Ninth Circuit reversing the district court’s dismissal,
chastising the trial court for repeatedly drawing inferences in the board’s favor. See
Rosenbloom v. Pyott, 765 F.3d 1137, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014).
41. Thomas & Thompson, supra note 5, at 1769.
42. See id. at 1770. By way of illustration, consider Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), where Matsushita was sued in two class actions: one in
federal court alleging violations of the federal securities laws regulating tender offers and
the other in the Delaware Chancery Court alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty by
company officers. Id. at 370. Matsushita prevailed in federal district court, and while that
decision was being appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Matsushita entered into a global
settlement approved by the Delaware court on terms that released the claims that were
raised only in federal court. Id. at 370–71. Even though the state court lacked jurisdiction
to entertain the federal securities law claims, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the full
faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution required upholding the global settlement,
provided the shareholders’ interests were adequately represented. Id. at 386–87. In Epstein
v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), the court held that the Delaware litigants and
their attorney adequately represented the shareholders in prosecuting that suit. Id. at 650.
In the background of this matter is the important fact that the two suits were being
prosecuted by two competing law firms and that the damages being pursued in the federal
district court were of a significantly greater amount than those at play in the Delaware
state action. Hence, precedent exists under which a reverse auction can occur, if not thrive.
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In addition to the frequency of deal-focused litigation, further
disquiet arises from recent evidence that non-cash settlements—
whether in the form of changes in merger agreement terms or
additional disclosure—do not have a significant impact on
shareholder approval rates for completed deals.43 The fear is that
regardless of whether the suits assert meritorious claims, the
settlements reached will not produce observable benefits. The
consequence of this being true is that judicial doctrines intended to
protect shareholders are instead yielding a dead weight loss in the
form of costly litigation.
Delaware has innovated in the face of the explosion of dealfocused litigation and growing awareness of the negative social
consequences that may be facilitated by multi-forum suits, and suits
generally, just as it did initially by creating the doctrine inviting these
cases. Among the state’s substantive innovations was excepting from
close burden-shifted fairness inquiry freezeouts pursuant to state
short-form merger statutes that allow parents to acquire a ninety
percent owned subsidiary solely upon the approval of the parent
board of directors.44 More recently in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide
Corp.,45 the Delaware Supreme Court held that an acquisition
involving the dominant stockholder would nonetheless enjoy a
presumption of fairness if there is both impartial approval by a
majority of the disinterested shareholders of the subsidiary and the
subsidiary was vigorously represented in the negotiations by a truly
independent negotiating committee.46 Where both of these conditions
are met, the transaction enjoys the substantial protections of the
business judgment rule, which is generally accorded to arm’s-length
transactions.47 The Delaware legislature has also entered this area by
authorizing a “streamlined back-end merger” whereby two
independent firms can merge upon (1) their boards approving the

43. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 580–81, 585 (2015) (finding that of 453 firms in the 2005–
2012 time period, 319 experienced litigation, of which 191 resulted in settlements that
either amended merger terms or provided only additional disclosure, which did not impact
the ultimate shareholder vote and was weak evidence that an increase in consideration
impacts shareholder vote).
44. See Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001).
45. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
46. Id. at 645–46.
47. Id. at 646.
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merger and (2) the acquirer, through a tender offer, obtaining enough
shares of the other company to assure approval of the merger.48
Further innovations have been made to confront the explosion of
multi-forum suits. Using mechanisms provided within corporate
statutes, corporate lawyers have developed a powerful antidote to
multi-forum suits through the now widely-adopted forum selection
clause. The standard forum selection clause is set forth in the
corporate bylaws and authorizes the board of directors to designate a
favored forum which is customarily, but not always, the corporation’s
state of incorporation. Forum selection bylaws were embraced by
now-Chief Justice of Delaware Leo Strine Jr. in Boilermakers Local
154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,49 where the court upheld a
unilaterally director-adopted forum selection bylaw, reasoning that
the bylaws, including the board’s authority to adopt bylaws, were an
extension of the shareholders’ contractual rights to the corporation.50
In 2015, the Delaware legislature passed a statute formally
authorizing the inclusion of forum selection provisions in corporate
bylaws.51
Thus, it is likely that there will be dramatic contractions in the
use of acquisition-oriented litigation in Delaware because of these
changes. While the Delaware courts initially developed broad
substantive doctrines that provided avenues for shareholders to
challenge the conduct of boards of directors in mergers and
acquisitions, they subsequently significantly narrowed the avenues for
doing so. This change, combined with Delaware’s approval of boards
adopting bylaws that channel those challenges to Delaware, will
restrict the scope of acquisition-oriented class actions. Moreover,
other state courts and legislatures are beginning to weigh in with
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2015). A similar provision was adopted in
Maryland in 2014. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-106.1 (West 2015).
49. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).
50. Id. at 954, 958.
51. Act of June 24, 2015, ch. 40, § 5, 80 Del. Laws __, __ (codified at DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 115). Governor Jack Markell signed the bill on June 24, 2015. Michael Greene,
Delaware Fee-Shifting Bill Signed into Law; Also Endorses Exclusive Forum Clauses,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 26, 2015), http://www.bna.com/delaware-feeshifting-billn17179928834/ [https://perma.cc/5UGS-BVM5]. The same legislation also added
sections 102 and 109, prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in articles of incorporation or
bylaws, respectively. See § 1, 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102, 109). Earlier,
following a contract-focused approach whereby the articles of incorporation and bylaws
are understood to define the shareholders’ relation with their corporation, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that, in the articles, the grant of authority to the board of directors to
amend the articles thus enables the board of directors to adopt a bylaw that would shift
the corporation’s litigation costs to the shareholder suit’s plaintiff if unsuccessful. ATP
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557–58 (Del. 2014).
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bylaw changes that would require fee shifting onto plaintiffs in these
class actions.52 The 800-pound gorilla in the room that has yet to be
addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws that
mandate sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration.53 What
does seem clear though is that the combination of these new bylaws
will most likely lead to less manager and director accountability to
shareholders.
B.

Appraisal Arbitrage: A Remedy for Controlling Shareholder SelfDealing?

In the past, merger litigation played a significant monitoring role
in addressing possible agency costs in corporate transactions,
especially by controlling shareholder squeezeouts of minority
shareholders in cash-out mergers. It was particularly valuable for
small shareholders who would otherwise be unable to bring cases to
challenge managerial misconduct in an acquisition. Empirical
research examining deal-focused litigation’s role at the turn of the
millennium found that class action lawsuits challenging the fairness of
the consideration paid in M&A transactions had a positive impact on
takeover premiums.54 However, as discussed above,55 the future of
merger litigation has been placed in jeopardy by the explosion of its
use, the adoption of forum selection bylaws, and, at least in some
jurisdictions, the availability of fee-shifting bylaws. If this is true, is
there another form of shareholder monitoring that could take its
place?
One possible candidate is appraisal litigation. In an appraisal
proceeding, shareholders can ask a court to determine the fair market
value of their shares if they dissent from, or do not vote in favor of, a
pending corporate transaction.56 State laws vary widely with respect to
52. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1126 (2015) (“In any derivative action instituted by
a shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon
final judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party
or parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a
result of such action.”).
53. See generally James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93
WASH. U. L. REV. 257 (2015) (arguing that boards of directors should not have the
authority to amend bylaws that affect the procedural and substantive relationship between
shareholders and the corporation); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem
of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583 (2016)
(arguing that recent Delaware cases are blurring the lines between contract law and those
laws that govern corporate formation and modification).
54. Krishnan et al., supra note 7, at 1262.
55. See supra Section I.A.
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2015).
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the availability of appraisal.57 States that are more solicitous of
shareholders provide appraisal for amendments to the articles of
incorporation that adversely affect the rights of stockholders, the sale
of all or substantially all the firm’s assets, and mergers and
consolidations;58 in contrast, Delaware limits its appraisal statute to
mergers and consolidations.59 Meanwhile, the Model Business
Corporation Act follows a course between these two positions.60
Traditionally, appraisal has been viewed as an ineffective remedy
for shareholders due to its cumbersome procedures and very limited
scope. Commentators have identified three significant disadvantages
with the appraisal remedy61: (1) the difficult procedural steps that
must be followed in precise order to preserve one’s right to the
remedy;62 (2) the lack of a class action procedure that would permit
easy joinder of all dissenting shareholders so that the costs of bringing
an action could be more widely shared;63 and (3) the narrow limits of
the remedy.64 Small shareholders were stymied by these problems,
while larger blockholders made sparing use of the appraisal remedy.65
As a result, historically few appraisal actions were filed and even

57. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 22.19, at 619 (2d ed.
2003).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 181, 1200–1203, 1300(a) (West 2015); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 910 (McKinney 2015).
59. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b).
60. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a) (2015).
61. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1560–61 (2015).
62. For example, under the Model Business Corporation Act, if a shareholder vote is
required for the fundamental change, the shareholders must give written notice of their
intent to dissent prior to the vote and then must refrain from voting in favor of the plan.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.21. Under the Delaware Act, after the vote, the corporation
must give notice of the right to dissent within ten days, and thereafter, the shareholders
have twenty days to make a written demand. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(2).
63. See Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1,
27–29 (2000) (describing the costs of appraisal proceedings).
64. The market out provision eliminates appraisal rights for mergers and
consolidations where there is a liquid market for their securities. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
§ 262(b)(1). The right to appraisal is restored if the target company’s shareholders are
required to take consideration different from the shares they formerly held, such as cash.
Thomas, supra note 63, at 11–12.
65. See generally Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (showing
the costs of pursuing appraisal, even to large shareholders). In Cede & Co., after the
minority shareholders of Technicolor, Inc. were cashed out, a beneficial owner sought
appraisal. Id. at 31. Unsatisfied with the result, the beneficial owners appealed. Id. at 32.
The result was an extensive sequence of litigation spanning almost twenty years, leading to
numerous disputes over the amount of the discount rate, whether post-judgment interest
was owed, and how much discretion was owed to the chancery court’s initial analysis. See
id. at 32–34.
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fewer were actively litigated.66 As developed below, the rise of hedge
funds and their resourcefulness in maximizing gain have resurrected
the appraisal remedy, at least in the hands of a large, sophisticated
investor.
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock were the first
scholars to note that hedge fund managers who were dissatisfied with
the terms of an acquisition were adapting appraisal litigation for a
new purpose.67 They point out that activist hedge funds engage in
appraisal arbitrage when they buy shares of a target company’s stock
with the objective of filing an appraisal petition, ultimately seeking a
higher price for their stock.68 Thus, appraisal arbitrage is a good
example of how the increasing concentration of stock ownership may
be leading to changes in shareholder-monitoring devices.69
Several authors have picked up this idea and written substantial
articles debating the appropriate role of appraisal litigation as a
monitor of M&A deals.70 Professor George Geis focused on a
Delaware Chancery Court appraisal decision, In re Appraisal of
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.71 This case resolved a technical question
about which shareholders qualified to seek appraisal after the
announcement of a merger.72 In particular, the court held that
shareholders that purchased their stock in the target company after
the record date for the stockholders’ meeting but before the date of
the stockholder vote and who therefore did not have the right to vote
the shares at the meeting could nonetheless seek appraisal.73 The net
effect of the decision was the facilitation of hedge funds accumulating

66. See Thomas, supra note 63, at 22–23 (finding an average of less than fourteen
appraisal actions filed per year from 1977 to 1997).
67. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1038–1039 (2007).
68. See id.
69. See Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, supra note
20.
70. See George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1635, 1640–41
(2011); Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2–4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2766776 [https://perma.cc/H75W-F2R8 (staff-uploaded archive)]; Korsmo &
Myers, supra note 61, at 1555–57; see also Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829,
835–36 (2014).
71. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
72. Id. at *1.
73. See id. at *3–4.
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substantial stakes in target companies in order to file appraisal actions
in the hopes of making large profits on their investments.74
Based on some hedge fund litigation over the scope of their
appraisal rights, Geis argues that “it is possible that a robust market
for appraisal rights will develop, analogous to the market for
corporate control that allegedly disciplines otherwise entrenched
managers with the threat of an external takeover.”75 If so, Geis
concludes that “corporate law might play a meaningful role in
enhancing firm value by policing freezeout mergers in a more
nuanced and creative manner.”76 Yet, Geis equivocates about
whether this is beneficial to target company shareholders because of
concerns that opening up the appraisal remedy will lead to more
strike suits and therefore suggests further restrictions on
shareholders’ (already quite limited) ability to bring these cases.77
Professors Charles Korsmo and Minor Myers provide very useful
empirical data on this phenomenon. Using a data set of appraisal
cases from 2004 to 2013, they found that the dollar value of dissenting
shares in appraisal actions spiked sharply in 2013.78 They documented
the rise of a small, but growing, group of hedge funds filing multiple
appraisal actions arising out of different transactions.79 These repeat
petitioners “target deals where the merger premium is low and where
controlling stockholders are taking the company private.”80
Considering these findings, Korsmo and Myers argue that a robust
appraisal remedy could be working in a socially responsible way as a
“back-end check on abuses by corporate managers, controlling
shareholders, or other insiders in merger transactions.”81
Professor Wei Jiang and her coauthors conducted a large-scale
empirical analysis of the characteristics, determinants, and returns to
appraisal petitions during 2000–2014.82 Using a hand-collected sample
including every appraisal case filed during that time period, they
found that appraisal petitions are more likely to be filed in goingprivate transactions, control shareholder squeezeouts, and
transactions that pay target shareholders low premiums over the
74. See Geis, supra note 70, at 1654–56; Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New
Hedge Fund Strategy?, supra note 20.
75. Geis, supra note 70, at 1638.
76. Id. at 1658.
77. Id. at 1676.
78. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1571 fig.3.
79. Id. at 1572.
80. Id. at 1583.
81. Id. at 1598.
82. Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 3.
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market price of their shares.83 These findings support Korsmo and
Myers’s claim that appraisal acts as a shareholder remedy against
abusive deals. However, Jiang and her colleagues found further
evidence suggesting that appraisal actions may sometimes be strike
suits—as of 2014, appraisal actions were filed in over one quarter of
all deals in which appraisal is available; eighty percent of these suits
were settled before trial, and many of these settlements were in
actions filed by very small investors.84
We are cautious about the effects of this potential trend. First,
any monitoring effects on M&A activity that will arise out of
appraisal litigation will be limited to the small set of deals where
appraisal is available. For example, even at the peak of this trend,
Korsmo and Myers found that only slightly more than 15% of
statutorily covered transactions had appraisal actions filed challenging
the consideration paid in the deal,85 although Jiang and her coauthors
found it to be around 25%.86 In addition, this percentage can be
expected to fall if deal planners restructure the transaction so as to
minimize or even avoid appraisal; one such strategy to remove any
opportunity for appraisal is to distribute stock as consideration for the
merger.87
The biggest class of public company transactions where appraisal
is currently available consists of cash-out mergers. Of these, thirdparty sales in arm’s-length transactions in a well-shopped deal are
likely to be fairly priced. In this class of deals, the Delaware courts
have “suggested that a market test of a transaction will serve as a
proxy for fair value in appraisal suits, so that arm’s-length deals with
adequate market checks do not create appraisal risks for buyers.”88 If
this is correct, shareholders would not be expected to file such cases,
as they are expensive to litigate and unlikely to result in judicial
determinations that the plaintiffs are entitled to a price greater than
the merger price. However, if such cases are being filed and settled
83. See id. at 4, 23–24.
84. Id. at 4, 19–20, 29.
85. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1569 fig.2.
86. See Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 42 fig.1.
87. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(2) (2015). To the extent this creates a
problem, the market out exception must be eliminated. As numerous critics have pointed
out, shareholders who receive marketable securities for their shares in a merger may still
need appraisal: if they sell those shares in the market after the merger, then they will
suffer an uncompensated loss. See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, supra note 61, at 1606–07.
88. COUNCIL OF THE CORP. LAW SECTION, DEL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SECTION 262
APPRAISAL AMENDMENTS 2 (2015), https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL
%20262%20Proposal%203-6-15%20Explanatory%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ERXMXPB].
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for valuable consideration, that would suggest they are frivolous cases
that have only nuisance value.
Among the remaining set of potential deals subject to the
appraisal remedy, appraisal would be expected to be most useful in
control shareholder squeezeouts—the transactions with the greatest
potential for below market premiums being paid in sale-of-control
transactions. In control shareholder squeezeouts, the transaction
cannot be subject to a market check, and “fiduciary duties and
litigation may not be sufficient to ensure that the merger price reflects
the fair value of the acquired shares.”89 Leveraged buyouts, which are
sometimes not adequately shopped to the market, may also raise
concerns about possible conflicts of interest because target firm
managers could seek to preserve their jobs after the transaction closes
or a private equity buyer may seek to hire them to run the firm.
Appraisal arbitrage may act to protect shareholders from being
shortchanged in a sale of control in these circumstances.
Second, appraisal, as it is currently structured, should be
unattractive to shareholders with minimal stakes in the target firm.
Given the great expense involved in fully litigating an appraisal action
and the absence of a class action mechanism, small shareholders
generally will not find appraisal to be cost effective.90 If such cases are
being filed and settled, as Jiang and her coauthors show, then it seems
likely that they are nuisance litigation. At least that seems to be the
conclusion reached by the Delaware Council of the Corporation Law
Section (the “Corporate Council”) when it proposed a de minimis
exception to the appraisal statute. The group was considering a
proposal that would impose limits on the remedy unless “the total
number of shares entitled to appraisal exceeds 1% of the outstanding
number of shares that could have sought appraisal; or . . . the value of
the merger consideration for the total number of shares entitled to
appraisal exceeds $1 million.”91 On June 16, 2016, Delaware enacted
this change to its appraisal statute.92

89. Id.
90. Indeed, small investors will benefit, if at all, from this appraisal litigation only if
there is an ex ante effect from the potential for appraisal litigation on an acquirers’
original pricing of the deal.
91. COUNCIL OF THE CORP. LAW SECTION, supra note 88, at 3–4.
92. Act of June 16, 2016, ch. 265, sec. 11, § 262(h), 80 Del. Laws __, __ (codified at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)); Amendments to Delaware General Corporation Law
Will Affect Appraisal Actions and “Intermediate-Form” Mergers, ROPES & GRAY LLP
(June 20, 2016), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/June/Amendments-toDelaware-General-Corporation-Law-Will-Affect-Appraisal-Actions.aspx [https://perma.cc
/ULW2-PTFE].
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This discussion raises an important empirical question: What
type of appraisal cases are being filed and brought to trial or, if they
are settled, what are the terms of those settlements? Korsmo and
Myers have collected data on cases that are tried in the Delaware
Chancery Court, but this constitutes a small subset of all appraisal
cases filed.93 Jiang and her coauthors have provided data on a subset
of these cases in which the terms of the settlements are disclosed.
They found that the size of the shareholder’s stake in the target
company is the best predictor of whether a case will go to trial.94
However, most of these cases are settled, and the terms of these
settlements are private.95 Without this information, it cannot be
predicted confidently what appraisal will look like in the future and
whether it will continue to grow into an important shareholder
monitoring mechanism.
C.

Hedge Fund Activism Reinvigorates the Market for Corporate
Control and Replaces Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions as an
Effective Monitoring Technique

The Delaware Supreme Court’s Time-Warner96 decision
substantially weakened the market for corporate control when it
made clear that the court would not force target companies to redeem
their poison pills in the face of a non-coercive, fairly-priced hostile
tender offer.97 This was followed by that same court’s Unitrin98
decision that greatly reduced an acquirer’s ability to win proxy
contests for corporate control.99 Similarly, Delaware upholds the
impregnable defensive combination of a staggered board and poison
pill.100 Such doctrinal developments put a thumb on the scale—
favoring managers. An accompanying decline of the hostile takeover
removed this disciplining force so that managerial agency costs rose.
When shareholder M&A litigation failed to fill the gap created, a
space opened for shareholder activists to attack these increasing
levels of managerial agency costs. Beginning in earnest in the early
93. See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9–10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712088 [https://perma.cc/G89Q-8543 (staff-uploaded archive)].
94. Jiang et al., supra note 70, at 5, 29–30.
95. Id. at 4, 9.
96. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 1990).
97. Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When
Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 516–17 (1993).
98. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
99. See id. at 1389–90.
100. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 54–55 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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2000s, a wave of hedge fund activism hit the United States, leading to
an increased level of M&A activity among targeted firms.101
In recent years, hedge funds have actively engaged many
companies in an effort to boost shareholder value.102 Empirical
studies find that the filing of an activist hedge fund’s Schedule 13D
creates positive average cumulative abnormal returns from 7% to
8%.103 The filings reflect that hedge funds often accumulate 6% to
10% of the target company’s stock,104 which in addition to triggering
the filing, also provides sufficient ownership to give them a strong
negotiating position if target management resists their efforts.
Moreover, other hedge funds and many less active institutional
investors, including some who have direct investments in the lead
hedge fund, will vote their shares in the target company in support of
the lead hedge fund.105 The combined effects of direct stock
ownership and support from other investors have enabled top hedge
funds to aggressively pursue the creation of shareholder value.106
That such value is created invites an important question: Where
do the gains reflected in the stock market price increase originate?
One line of research finds that much of the gains generated by hedge
fund activism arise out of the increased likelihood that targeted firms
will be sold or engage in spinoffs.107 For example, Robin Greenwood
and Michael Schor found that activist hedge funds’ returns are largely
produced by takeover premiums.108 Another recent article finds that
in the second wave of activism running from 2008 to the present, the
101. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J.
FIN. ECON. 362, 364, 365 tbl.1 (2009).
102. Brav et al., supra note 15, 1741.
103. Id. at 1730.
104. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors:
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5, 15 (2013).
105. See Edelman et al., supra note 15, at 1414; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 15, at
913–14.
106. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of
Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP.
FIN. 296, 297 (2016) (explaining how hedge fund activists have achieved support and
success through their reputation).
107. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4
FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185, 217–18 (2009). While sales of the company generally result in
a premium price being paid to the target company’s shareholders, the impact of spin-offs is
more nuanced. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Does a Deal Have the Right Chemistry, or Is It
Just Financial Engineering?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2015, at B5 (noting that “a spinoff has
become the transaction du jour[,]” whose benefits are disproportionately realized by
short-term investors while long-term performance is weak).
108. Greenwood & Schor, supra note 101, at 363. Those authors find that activist
targets which do not result in a takeover have abnormal returns statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Id.
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largest and most successful hedge funds using a variety of aggressive
techniques—such as proxy contests for board representation lawsuits
and media campaigns—force target companies to put themselves up
for sale.109 Moreover, these successful activists target firms with the
greatest level of anti-takeover defenses, suggesting they are
addressing the gap created by the closing of the market for corporate
control. Thus, the weaknesses in corporate law in effectively
regulating management antitakeover initiatives are being addressed
through hedge fund activism.
Hedge fund activism also acts as a check on poor management
performance. Poor management can contribute to why target firms
are generally undervalued by the market. Through their active
engagement, hedge funds often are able to create value by improving
the operating performance of these firms. For example, one set of
researchers found that firms targeted by activists experience a 1.22%
increase in operating efficiency one year after acquisition.110
Moreover, another recent paper reports that the most successful
hedge funds generate substantial improvements in operating
performance at target firms with one-year post-intervention ROA
growth of 9.24%, sales growth of 2.54%, and R&D investment growth
of 3.42%.111 This suggests an additional path by which hedge fund
activism combats managerial slack.
Corporate management and its supporters have a less rosy view
of hedge fund activism: they argue that hedge funds are pursuing
short-term profits at the expense of the long-term investors in
targeted companies.112 Some advocates of this position have gone so
109. Krishnan et al., supra note 106, at 297.
110. Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as
Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324 (2008); see also Brav et al., supra note 15,
at 1772.
111. See Krishnan et al., supra note 106, at 309 tbl.9. Finally, in these interventions,
hedge funds frequently seek to force companies to pay out dividends or buy back shares as
a means of distributing to shareholders “excess cash.” Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1741.
However, these capital structure changes do not appear to be the source of the market
gains associated with hedge fund activism. See id. at 1771–73; Greenwood & Schor, supra
note 101, at 371. Rather, just as the Miller and Modigliani theorem predicts, they are just a
reshuffling of firm’s capital structure that does little to affect firm value. See Franco
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 279 (1958) (stating that “a firm cannot reduce the
cost of capital . . . by securing part of its capital through the sale of bonds”).
112. Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II and Some Thoughts for
Boards of Directors in 2007, NAT’L LEGAL CTR. FOR PUB. INT., Dec. 2006, at 1, 1 (noting
that one of the principal problems that causes concern about American business in the
future is “[p]ressure on boards from activist investors to manage for short-term share price
performance rather than long-term value creation”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
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far as to argue that hedge fund shareholders ought to have fiduciary
duties to other shareholders as a check on their allegedly
opportunistic conduct.113 Yet, the data reviewed above shows that at
least during a one-year time period there are performance
improvements, and no one has yet published peer-reviewed research
finding a longer-term problem.114
There are several other reasons to question the claim that hedge
funds are short-term profit oriented. First, hedge funds seem to have
little trouble recruiting institutional investors to support their activist
goals.115 If hedge funds’ plans only produced short-term gains at the
expense of long-term profitability, these long-term investors would be
reluctant to support them.116 Second, activist hedge fund holding
periods average approximately twenty-one months,117 which is
substantially longer than almost all other investors. Finally, one study
of hedge fund interventions from 1994 to 2007 finds that the stock
price gains accompanying the initial announcement of a hedge fund’s
activism were sustained over a five-year period, as were
improvements in other measures of returns.118 Taken together, this

Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1663–64
(2013) (arguing against claims that activist investors take profitable short term actions that
decrease long term value); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom
and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977, 982 (2013) (reporting that managerial and
boardroom autonomy have been justified recently by claims that activist hedge fund
shareholders are focused on short-term gains); Steven M. Davidoff, A Standard Criticism
of Activist Investors That No Longer Holds Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at B5
(describing and rejecting the claim that hedge funds are short-term shareholders).
113. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1295–96 (2008).
114. For evidence that finds positive long-term impacts of hedge fund activisim, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang,
Long-Term Effects]. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 104, at 4–5 (finding that activist hedge
funds are only a small portion of investors filing pursuant to section 13(d) disclosure
requirements, with average shares amounting to less than ten percent, which is contrary to
claims that activist hedge funds have accumulated more pre-disclosure shares over the
years); Roe, supra note 112, at 1005–06 (containing an extensive discussion of the
evidence, both pro and con, of claims that investors with a short-term perspective are
harming corporations before ultimately rejecting these arguments).
115. For a list of those parties from which hedge funds seek support, see Kahan &
Rock, supra note 67, at 1089.
116. Id. at 1088.
117. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375,
1420 tbl.VIII (2007).
118. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 114, at 1123–30; see
also Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists 2–3
(Apr. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1787649 [https://perma.cc/WBW6-AXS6 (staff-uploaded archive)] (finding
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evidence supports the claim that hedge fund activism is not
dominated by short-term considerations but rather generates valuable
monitoring of corporate management.119
Private equity firms interact in important ways with hedge funds
and facilitate hedge fund activism. One hedge fund strategy that
generates substantial shareholder value is persuading targeted firms
to put themselves up for sale, often to private equity firms.120 These
sales are generally at substantial premiums over the prior market
prices and act to discipline management of underperforming
companies as well as create ongoing pressure on managers at other
(potentially targeted) firms to aggressively maximize shareholder
value.
Overall, activist hedge funds, sometimes working with private
equity firms, have been able to fill the shareholder monitoring
function of the market for corporate control. This serves as a second
example of how increasingly concentrated share ownership makes for
more efficient shareholder monitoring of managerial agency costs. In
combination with a slightly increased role for the appraisal remedy in
the hands of appraisal arbitrageurs, these changes have largely offset
the decline in the monitoring value of acquisition-oriented
shareholder class actions and the decline of the hostile takeover.
II. WORKING AROUND THE WEAKNESSES OF DERIVATIVE SUITS AS
MONITORS OF EXECUTIVE PAY
Derivative suits are another type of representative litigation that
shareholders can use as a monitoring device. Traditional derivative
cases raise state law breach of fiduciary duty claims against directors
and officers.121 Typically, these claims allege breach of the duties of
loyalty (including good faith) and care as well as other state law
violations.122 They are commonly used to attack directors or officers
engaging in conflict of interest transactions with the corporation or
taking corporate opportunities belonging to the corporation.123 Small
shareholders can bring these actions on behalf of the corporation in a

that hedge fund activism can improve long-term performance for target firms and hedge
funds).
119. See Davidoff, supra note 112, at B5; see also Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and
Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459,
479 (2013) (finding that hedge funds are not short term in their focus).
120. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 101, at 372.
121. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 57, § 15.02, at 423–24.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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representative capacity; because they are focused primarily on abuses
within a single self-dealing transaction, they customarily do not
involve sums that are significant vis-à-vis the total value of the firm.124
Hence, complaints claim that derivative suits are abusive, as they are
prosecuted by investors with a small stake in the suit’s outcome and
produce results unlikely to impact overall shareholder wealth.125
Among the broad group of shareholder suits, derivative suit
litigation consists of the most stable set of cases. There has been little
change in the underlying set of legal and procedural rules for
derivative litigation in the past twenty years. In prior research, one of
the authors studied all derivative litigation filed in Delaware during
1999 and 2000.126 The study found that Delaware public companies
were hit with about thirty cases per year, with about thirty percent of
them yielding relief to the corporation or its shareholders and the
remainder being quickly dismissed with little litigation activity.127
Private Delaware firms were targeted with a dozen lawsuits annually,
typically raising claims of minority oppression.128
This research shows that a careful distinction must be made
between public and private corporations when discussing the role of
shareholder derivative suits. Derivative suits are very much alive and
well in the public company setting. In this context, they perform their
historical function of remedying breaches of the duty of loyalty—
customarily in the form of acts in bad faith and, more particularly,
self-dealing practices. In the close corporation context, they are better
seen as remedying opportunistic behavior by those in control.
A. The Derivative Suit’s Impotence to Address Excessive
Compensation
One troubling area for the derivative suit as a governor for selfinterested conduct is executive compensation. Whether one views
executive pay as an endemic problem with American corporate
governance129 or a more isolated problem involving a few bad

124. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 677–78.
125. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 6, at 84 (arguing that shareholder litigation is a
weak, if not ineffective, instrument to regulate managers or provide shareholder value).
126. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1760–61 (2004).
127. Id. at 1749–50.
128. Id. at 1750.
129. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
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apples,130 most experts agree that the derivative suit has been a weak
tool to address executive compensation concerns.131 As developed
below, the derivative suit is hobbled both procedurally and
substantively when directed at alleged excessive executive
compensation.132
The procedural impediment results from a major feature of the
derivative suit: the requirement that the plaintiff must either make a
demand on the board of directors or establish a basis for why such a
demand would be futile.133 The outcome in either case ultimately
depends on whether the court believes the board, or a subcommittee
of the board, is sufficiently independent of alleged wrongdoing in the
suit so that the board’s opinion that the suit fails to serve a corporate
interest will be upheld by the reviewing court. As a consequence of
the demand requirement, there exists a very large boneyard
comprised of failed derivative suits challenging executive
compensation in public companies.
In the case of private corporations, the disputes are largely
between the “ins” and the “outs,” making the demand requirement
much less lethal because the alleged wrongdoing at the heart of the
suit frequently can be more easily linked to a majority of the board.
In contrast, the public company’s board is dominated by outside
directors, so there is a healthy presumption of independence with
respect to whether the suit furthers the corporate interest as well as
the substantive appropriateness of the compensation package. The
board itself is further protected from claims of overpaying executives
by the widespread adoption of immunity shields whereby a provision
in the firm’s articles of incorporation insulates directors from liability
for misconduct that is not a breach of the duty of loyalty, illegal, in
bad faith, or a knowing violation of the law.134 Immunity shields thus
limit suits against directors that allege such a managerial failure to
claims that the directors had knowingly engaged in systematic
130. See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1143 (2005)
(questioning whether the problems with CEO compensation are isolated to a few
instances or applicable to CEOs as a whole).
131. Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts:
Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV.
846, 855 (2011).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (2015) (imposing a condition of universal
demand for derivative suits).
134. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2015). In some states, statutes that
provide the standards for directors also protect officers. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10A-28.30, -8.42 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.).
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breaches on the part of the board. It is unimaginable that such a claim
can be successful in an environment in which executive compensation
packages arise from a multistep process that involves external
consultants, human resource professionals, and a deliberative process
of at least a committee of the board. A claim of this nature is even
more difficult to mount because the entire process is guided by
counsel who will assure that steps are taken to ensure that
compensation is set in a manner consistent with the desired image of
due deliberation.
The derivative suit has not always been impotent in confronting
executive compensation.135 During the Great Depression, a good deal
of litigation ensued, successfully attacking bonus and incentive
compensation policies of large public companies.136 The leading case
of the day, Rogers v. Hill,137 held that compensation received by the
firm’s president and directors was large enough to merit investigation
as to whether it was misuse under the bylaws.138 Rogers reasoned that
stockholder support and a presumption of regularity and continuity
concerning the bylaws
cannot . . . be used to justify payments of sums as salaries so
large as in substance and effect to amount to spoliation or waste
of corporate property. . . . “If a bonus payment has no relation
to the value of the services for which it is given, it is in reality a
gift in part and the majority stockholders have no power to give
away corporate property . . . .”139
Rogers thus reflected the then-contemporary approach to assess the
overall reasonableness of the compensation package. In current
times, given the requirement that a majority of directors be
independent at listed public companies, the barest approval by a
majority of the board of directors insulates executive compensation.140

135. Shareholders may also be successful in some stage of derivative lawsuits filed that
challenge aspects of executive compensation, even though this may not lead to a final
judgment in their favor. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 569, 571 (2001).
136. See George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 733, 736–56 (1941) (reviewing the case history of Great Depression era
compensation cases).
137. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
138. Id. at 591–92.
139. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J., dissenting)).
140. See NYSE LISTED COMP. MANUAL § 303A.01, .05 (2016), http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ [https://perma.cc/39DG-6G8Y]; NASDAQ EQUITY RULES
§ 5605-1, -6 (2016), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/Main/ [https://perma.cc
/A7NB-FMM3]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10C-1 (2015).
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Illustrative of the high substantive protection executive
compensation enjoys from challenges by shareholders is the recent
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Freedman v. Adams.141 A
shareholder derivative suit was initiated to recover more than $130
million in bonuses approved by the board of XTO Energy Inc.142 The
plan lacked performance-based standards, a requirement by section
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code for compensation in excess of
$1 million to be a deductible business expense on XTO Energy’s tax
return.143 After the plaintiff initiated the derivative suit, complaining
that the lack of any performance benchmarks had the consequence of
raising the corporation’s taxes, the board prospectively modified the
plan and the plaintiff dropped her suit.144 In responding to the
plaintiff’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees incident to the
claim, XTO Energy argued that the board was fully aware of section
162(m) but made a conscious decision not to avail itself of that section
because it believed its approach to compensation decisions should not
be constrained by such a plan.145 The court denied any award of fees
to the plaintiff because it held that a claim for waste had not been
stated.146 The court reasoned that “[e]ven if the decision was a poor
one,” as alleged by the plaintiff, “it was not unconscionable or
irrational.”147 In other words, the court held that the plaintiff had not
established waste, even when the board of directors gave up an easily
available tax deduction in exchange for no apparent benefit to the
corporation.
In addition to the weak substantive standards in the regulation of
executive compensation, a derivative suit plaintiff typically faces
insurmountable procedural barriers in attacking compensation.148
141. 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013).
142. Id. at 416.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 417.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. A typical example is In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), one of the most celebrated U.S. executive
compensation decisions. The facts are complicated, but at their core, the complaint was
that, under pressure from Disney CEO Michael Eisner, the Disney board hired Michael
Ovitz with knowledge that Ovitz had no experience for the position, only to have that
confirmed within an admittedly short period of time; subsequently the board, without
consulting outside experts regarding the corporation’s ability to terminate Ovitz’s without
breaching the employment contract, quickly agreed to a $140 million severance package.
See id. at 699–714. Even though both the trial court and Delaware Supreme Court
acknowledged grave departures from good corporate practices, each held that the
misconduct did not rise to the level of bad faith and hence was protected under the firm’s
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Derivative suits challenging an executive’s compensation are
regularly rejected on the ground of “failure to make a demand” on
the board of directors. Under the orthodox view, a demand is excused
on grounds of futility, which requires evidence that either (1) the
compensation is so egregious as to be beyond the protection of the
business judgment rule or (2) the plaintiff has alleged with sufficient
particularity that a majority of the board of directors lacks sufficient
independence from the suit, or the suit’s defendants, to render an
impartial decision on whether the suit’s continuance would be in the
corporation’s best interest.149 Moreover, even if a demand is excused
on the grounds that it is futile, the board of directors can resurrect its
ability to interdict the derivative suit by creating a special litigation
committee of independent directors who can thereby provide an
independent voice on whether the suit’s continuance is in the best
interest of the company.150
Thus, litigation through the derivative suit is not, and for some
time has not been, a credible check on executive compensation in
public companies. To the extent directors feel constrained in their
executive pay decisions, they act out of concerns that do not include
the fear of litigation. In this space, the Say on Pay mechanism
assumes great importance.
B.

Say on Pay

Excessive compensation payments to top corporate executives
are a sign of managerial agency costs. Good corporate governance
supports arguments in favor of effective shareholder monitoring of
these payments. As noted, shareholder derivative suits have proven

immunity shield. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67–68 (Del.
2006).
149. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (finding no futility on an
allegation that defendant controlled forty-seven percent of the voting stock and would
receive a six-figure annual compensation regardless of service to the company); Marx v.
Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1042–43 (N.Y. 1996) (excusing demand for compensation that
directors set for themselves, but finding no factual basis to sustain allegations of
wrongdoing or waste in directors’ compensation increases).
150. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785–86 (Del. 1981) (setting
forth procedures for evaluating a committee recommendation in a suit challenging the
board’s decision to accelerate the exercise date of options that greatly reduced the taxable
income related to executive options while simultaneously reducing the deduction the
corporation would enjoy in connection with the options). Nonetheless, some courts closely
evaluate the committee’s reasons supporting any such recommendation, so that the
deference normally attendant director decisions is reduced in the instance of the rejection
of a derivative suit’s continuation. See, e.g., Boland v. Boland, 31 A.3d 529, 561–62 (Md.
2011).
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largely impotent to either redress or retard executive compensation
abuses. Executive pay challenges, even when coupled with
suggestions of influence by a dominant controlling stockholder, are
crushed by the deference accorded boards of directors under the
procedural and substantive derivative suit requirements.151
The federally mandated Say on Pay vote by shareholders is a
recent regulatory initiative designed to bolster shareholder
monitoring of executive compensation practices.152 In the United
States, Say on Pay was adopted when Congress passed the DoddFrank Act of 2010; Dodd-Frank required, among other things, that
each U.S. public company hold an advisory shareholder vote on the
compensation of its top executives.153 In the first set of such votes,
held during the 2011 proxy season, shareholders strongly supported
existing pay practices at most firms with Say on Pay votes getting an
average of 91.2% of shareholder support.154 The average support
levels remained high in subsequent years, with more than threequarters of companies in the Russell 3000 receiving at least 90%
shareholder support in 2012 and 2013.155 At the other end of the
spectrum, only 1% to 2% of firms (forty to sixty firms of the Russell

151. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808 (dismissing the suit for failure to excuse
demand where six-figure annual compensation was payable to a stockholder who owned
forty-seven percent of outstanding shares regardless of his ability to serve as executive);
Marx, 666 N.E.2d at 1036 (dismissing the suit challenging CEO compensation for failure to
excuse a demand where the board was not shown to have acted egregiously).
152. Thomas & Van der Elst, supra note 18, at 656.
153. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)) (adding new
section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see Randall S. Thomas, Alan R.
Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for
Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1225 (2012)
(discussing the phase-in of the requirement based on the size of the company).
154. TED ALLEN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., PRELIMINARY 2011
U.S. POSTSEASON REPORT 1 (2011), http://mercyinvestmentservices.org/storage
/documents/Pre-PSR.20110801.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UVR-PHJJ]; see also Say-on-Pay
Support Runs High in 2013, with Few Exceptions, Reports Show, [June] Corp. L. Daily
(BNA) (June 3, 2013) (reporting on a study by Meridian Compensation Partners that
found, on average, that 90.3% of shareholders voted in favor of company Say on Pay
proposals with only 2% receiving less than 50% support); cf. James F. Cotter, Alan R.
Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 998–1001 (2013)
(reporting results from the early 2012 proxy season, showing that 2012 was a more difficult
season for issuers of Say on Pay proposals).
155. Say-on-Pay Support Runs High in 2013, with Few Exceptions, Reports Show, supra
note 154.
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3000) received less than 50% shareholder support during the 2011
proxy season.156
Small institutional shareholders tend to be more likely than
larger ones to vote against management’s Say on Pay proposals,157
perhaps because of their lack of alternative methods for confronting
management with their opinions. Furthermore, when ownership is
more dispersed, the Say on Pay vote “provides an opportunity for
many small institutional shareholders to coordinate, and to voice a
unified opinion” about management’s pay.158 However, on occasion,
large shareholders have joined smaller shareholders in expressing
their displeasure with unjustifiable pay.
Although there have not been a large number of negative votes,
Say on Pay votes can be seen as having a significant effect on
American corporate governance.159 Dodd-Frank’s mandated
shareholder votes focus directors on shareholders’ concerns about
executive pay, increase shareholder participation in corporate
governance, and open lines of communication between management
and shareholders (and proxy advisory firms) regarding executive
compensation.160 Multiple forces unleashed by mandated Say on Pay
votes have caused management at many companies to make changes
to the substance and disclosure of their pay programs in an attempt to
more clearly align pay to performance.161 Many companies have also
revised the content of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis
(CD&A) filed with the annual meeting proxy materials.162
156. See Cotter et al., supra note 154, at 979–80. Some commentators claim that 67%
support is a more important threshold because “ballots that fail to garner a two-thirds
majority are an indication of potential problems, especially since more than 90 percent of
the votes analyzed passed with a supermajority.” Ryan Krause, Kimberly A. Whitler &
Matthew Semadeni, When Do Shareholders Care About CEO Pay?, DIRECTOR NOTES,
August 2013, at 2, https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB_DNV5N16-131.pdf&type=subsite [https://perma.cc/WB53-CA95]; see also Facts Behind 2013
Failed Say on Pay Votes, GORGESON (June 11, 2013), http://www.computershare-na.com
/sharedweb/georgeson/georgeson_report/GeorgesonReport_061113.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8PLP-2V4Y].
157. See Schwartz-Ziv & Wermers, supra note 19, at 3.
158. Id. at 2.
159. See Thomas et al., supra note 153, at 1227, 1256–57.
160. See Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC
Commissioner: An Inflection Point: The SEC and the Current Financial Reform
Landscape (June 10, 2011) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011
/spch061011laa.htm [https://perma.cc/67D9-YC8H]).
161. See Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania & Justin Neidig, A Closer Look at
Negative Say-on-Pay Votes During the 2011 Proxy Season, DIRECTOR NOTES, July 2011,
at 2, https://www.conferenceboard.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DN-V3N14-111.pdf
&type=subsite [https://perma.cc/WZ38-UH2U].
162. Thomas et al., supra note 153, at 1257.
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Meanwhile, at companies whose pay programs received negative Say
on Pay recommendations by proxy advisory firms, most boards took a
variety of steps to engage shareholders following an “against”
recommendation.163
Since the introduction of Say on Pay as a regulatory tool on U.S.
public companies, scholars have conducted multiple studies that
measure the effects it has on corporate actions and executive pay.
One interesting new line of research on Say on Pay’s monitoring
effects finds that
companies that have a non-insider blockholder and receive low
support rates for the SOP vote are significantly more likely to:
(1) pick more reasonable (modest) peer-companies for
determining executive compensation, (2) decrease the growth
rate of the excess compensation, and (3) experience CEO
turnover within 12 months of the SOP vote, relative to
companies that do not have a non-insider blockholder.164
This suggests that Say on Pay is most effective when a large
blockholder serves as a “reluctant watchdog.”165
Yet, in the United States, studies have suggested that Say on Pay
has not led to lower executive pay levels or to changes in its
composition.166 Research on the United Kingdom has also found that
overall CEO pay levels do not seem to have changed as a result of

163. Cotter et al., supra note 154, at 969–70.
164. See Schwartz-Ziv & Wermers, supra note 19, at 5.
165. Id.
166. Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! Shareholder Voice
and Firm Performance, 20 REV. FIN. 1799, 1826 (2016); Peter Iliev & Svetla Vitanova, The
Effect of the Say-on-Pay Vote in the U.S. 3 (Feb. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235064 [https://perma.cc/5P2S-3BP4
(staff-uploaded archive)]. Iliev and Vitanova state the following:
We find that compliance with the Say-on-Pay rule did not cause a decrease in
levels of CEO pay. On the contrary, firms that had to comply with the new rule
experienced both an increase in the total CEO pay and paid more cash bonuses.
Firms with mandatory Say-on-Pay votes also showed an increase in the frequency
of termination and change-of-control provisions, further supporting the notion
that the overall pay increase is driven by higher risks for the CEO. Further, the
market reacted negatively to the announcement of the unexpected two-year
exemption for small firms, consistent with a positive net effect from the new rule.
Finally, firms that had to comply with the Say-on-Pay rule experienced a
significant increase in support for their directors during shareholder elections.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that the new Say-on-Pay
rule did not have the effect of curbing CEO compensation.
Iliev & Vitanova, supra, at 27.
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Say on Pay votes.167 However, internationally, Ricardo Correa and
Ugur Lel have found that pay growth rates are lower in their
comparative study of countries that have adopted Say on Pay
legislation.168 Their cross-country study of thirty-nine nations—twelve
that have adopted Say on Pay and twenty-seven that have not—finds
that although “CEO compensation has increased in several [Say on
Pay] countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom,
the growth in CEO pay is higher [in countries] not subject to [Say on
Pay] laws.”169
In sum, Say on Pay acts as a low-cost monitoring measure for
shareholder groups and has some impact on executive compensation
abuses. While it does not have a dramatic effect on compensation
levels or composition, it has shifted corporate governance patterns,
leading to more interaction between management and shareholders
over compensation issues. Smaller institutional investors have been
more willing to vote against management pay packages, but Say on
Pay’s biggest effects take course when large outside blockholders join
smaller institutional investors in voting “no” on excessive
compensation packages. Finally, the up-to-date data supports the
intuition that a periodic Say on Pay vote and the dialogue it prompts
with proxy advisors and large blockholders diminish the rate of
compensation increases from what would be the case were there no
Say on Pay vote requirement.
C.

Hedge Fund Activism and Executive Compensation

While Say on Pay is a low-cost shareholder monitoring technique
that has had relatively limited effects, shareholder monitoring of
excessive executive compensation can also come in higher impact
forms, such as through the market for corporate control. During the
1980s, many bust-up takeovers were motivated in part by claims that
target company managers were entrenched in power and helping
167. Martin Conyon & Graham Sadler, Shareholder Voting and Directors’
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the U.K., 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE 296,
297 (2010) (finding no change in the overall level of executive pay or its rate of growth
subsequent to Say on Pay votes); see also Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay
Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence From the U.K., 17 REV. FIN. 527, 559 (2013)
(finding that firms did adjust contractual features and increase sensitivity to pay for
performance in response to negative vote outcomes).
168. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay
Slice, and Firm Value Around the World, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at
8), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X16301544 [https://perma.cc
/R7S6-28RT (staff-uploaded archive)].
169. Id. Figure 1 illustrates the gap between the two groups of countries. See id. at 9
fig.1.
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themselves to overly generous amounts of compensation. While
undoubtedly this was not the most important motive for hostile
acquisitions, it did become a rallying cry for many shareholders.170
While the 1980s traditional hostile takeover has largely
disappeared, in recent years, hedge fund activists have targeted firms
with high levels of executive pay.171 Although this targeting may be
largely done to attract the support of other investors for other
initiatives, it has increased the level of management turnover and
reduced significantly the level of executive compensation at targeted
firms.172 Alon Brav and others found that in the year that firms were
targeted by hedge funds, “the CEO compensation in the target
companies is on average $914,000 higher . . . than the equivalent
measure of CEO compensation at peer companies in the same
industry that are of similar size and stock valuation” but that “[o]ne
year after hedge fund intervention, CEO pay at targeted firms is not
distinguishable from peer levels.”173 Compensation form also changed
with increases in pay-for-performance sensitivity levels.174
Thus, we argue that derivative litigation’s weaknesses in
monitoring excessive managerial pay have been compensated by the
introduction of low cost Say on Pay monitoring and by the rapid
expansion of higher impact hedge fund activism.175 This statement
leads to the question: Are there other areas where derivative
litigation is failing, and if so, what monitoring techniques may be
taking its place?
III. THE DERIVATIVE SUIT AND STEWARDSHIP OF THE FIRM
In contrast to its low impact in policing executive compensation,
derivative suit litigation remains a viable medium within a narrow
area at public companies—the so-called “failure to oversee” claims
against the board. Such claims find their source in former Chancellor

170. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 113 (1965) (noting that executive compensation leads to lower share prices,
which makes companies attractive targets, but stating that “it is extremely doubtful that
the full compensation recoverable by executives for managing their corporations explains
more than a small fraction of outsider attempts to take over control”).
171. See Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1742 tbl.1 (depicting a summary of hedge funds’
stated goals).
172. See id. at 1768 tbl.7.
173. Id. at 1767.
174. Id.
175. See Krishnan et al., supra note 106, at 297 (demonstrating increased levels of
hedge fund activism in the post-financial crisis period).
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Allen’s path-breaking Caremark176 decision, holding that directors’
duty of good faith is breached when there is evidence of a “sustained
or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight.”177
A. “Failure to Oversee” Claims in Derivative Suits
A dramatic instance of such a suit is In re Massey Energy
Company Derivative and Class Action Litigation.178 In that case, the
court noted that the complaint would have survived a motion to
dismiss by alleging facts reflecting that the board repeatedly ignored
reports and sanctions of mine safety violations in the years preceding
the explosion in its Upper Big Branch mine that killed twenty-nine
miners—the deadliest mine accident in the United States in forty
years.179
But, absent such dramatic pre-disaster warnings as occurred in
Massey, failure of oversight claims confront two important bulwarks
that protect directors—the ubiquitous immunity shield provision and
the demand requirement. Unless the claims of lack of oversight rise to
the level of a purposeful abandonment, as contrasted with a breach
sounding in negligence, the standard immunity shield insulates the
offending directors from liability. There is frequently insufficient
evidence on which to conclude that the board has engaged in more
than negligent oversight, and therefore, the immunity shield often
insulates the board from liability.
Indeed, the Delaware judiciary has concluded that ignoring red
flags may not even rise to the level of director negligence. To
illustrate, consider In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation,180 which held that the business judgment rule insulated the
directors against claims that they failed to take precautions to protect
against losses from Citigroup’s large exposure to the subprime
lending markets.181 The suit alleged ample red flags that should have
caught the board’s eye, such as an economist’s forecast that a
speculative bubble was nearing its end, a leading subprime lender
closing its 229 offices, another lender filing bankruptcy, analysts
downgrading subprime mortgages, and a warning of increasing
subprime delinquencies by another lender.182
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 971.
C.A. No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
See id. at *21.
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
See id. at 139.
Id. at 115.
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Nevertheless, the court reasoned,
The “red flags” . . . amount to little more than portions of public
documents that reflected the worsening conditions in the
subprime mortgage market and in the economy generally.
Plaintiffs fail to plead “particularized facts suggesting that the
Board was presented with ‘red flags’ alerting it to potential
misconduct” . . . . [The plaintiffs] repeatedly make the
conclusory allegation that the defendants have breached their
duty of oversight, but nowhere do [they] adequately explain
what the director defendants actually did or failed to do that
would constitute such a violation. Even while admitting that
Citigroup had a risk monitoring system in place, plaintiffs seem
to conclude that, because the director defendants . . . were
charged with monitoring Citigroup’s risk, then they must be
found liable because Citigroup experienced losses as a result of
exposure to the subprime mortgage market. The only factual
support plaintiffs provide for this conclusion are “red flags”
that actually amount to nothing more than signs of continuing
deterioration in the subprime mortgage market. These types of
conclusory allegations are exactly the kinds of allegations that
do not state a claim for relief under Caremark.183
The above reasoning appears consistent with the observation
made in a widely-noted Delaware Supreme Court decision, In re The
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,184 that conduct offending good
corporate governance practices nonetheless is not inherently
negligent conduct.185 Thus, the immunity shield requires that the
derivative suit plaintiff show that the board was more than merely
negligent, and the plaintiff must prove a high standard of fault to even
show that directors acted negligently. These two principles, in
tandem, severely restrict the scope of the derivative duty to monitor
suits.
Indeed, the division between Massey and Citigroup may be that
Citigroup involved a challenge to legitimate business practices,
whereas Massey is riveted, as was Caremark, on the directors’
conscious disregard of the corporation’s adherence with the law when
183. Id. at 128–30 (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, No.
Civ.A. 1449-N, 2006 WL 391931, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006)); see also Cent. Laborers’
Pension Fund v. Dimon, 638 Fed. App’x 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 2016) (affirming the
dismissal of a shareholder derivative suit bringing a Caremark claim under Delaware law
against JPMorgan Chase for its failure to institute internal controls sufficient to detect
Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme).
184. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
185. Id. at 64–65.
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implementing business strategies. After all, Chancellor Allen’s
opinion emphasized the important role that compliance programs had
assumed for U.S. corporations when he justified departing from the
earlier Delaware precedent that expressly relieved directors of the
need to superintend the corporation’s systems to assure compliance
with the law.186 Even if this is the means to distinguish the conflicting
results reached in Massey and Citigroup, the facts required to satisfy
even Massey reflect such an abandonment of the directors’
monitoring role as to suggest outright complicity in the lawless acts
rather than a want of oversight. As such, Caremark appears cabined
to the extremes of corporate misbehavior.187
B.

Where Federal Securities Class Actions Do Not Wither:
Management Stewardship

Another potential avenue for shareholder monitoring of failures
in management stewardship is through securities fraud class actions.
The story of few trials and many tribulations of federal securities class
actions is well understood. At first glance, these suits appear poorly
placed to assume a greater role in providing shareholder monitoring
of managerial oversight. For one thing, the number of such suits has
been declining in recent years. Cornerstone Research, a litigation
support group, reported that even though the total securities class
action filings in 2015 (189) were the most since 2008, filings against
companies within the S&P 500 remained well below historical
averages.188 More generally, the number of securities class action
filings in 2013, although in line with the immediate two preceding
years, was thirteen percent below the historical average number of
annual filings.189 At least since 2005, the trend line in filings has been
downward.190
With the decline in securities fraud class action filings, there has
been a concomitant decline in the number of settlements reached
each year. While the average number of settlements from 1996–2013
186. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–31 (Del. 1963).
187. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate
Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms),
87 U. VA. L. REV. 1279, 1299 n.60 (2001); Mae Kuykendall, Producing Corporate Text:
Courtrooms, Conference Rooms, and Classrooms, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 593, 624 (2010–
2011).
188. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2015 YEAR
IN REVIEW 4–5, 18 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SecuritiesClass-Action-Filings-2015-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/B4A9-ARVN].
189. See id. at 30 app.1.
190. See id. (showing trend).
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is 124 per year, there were just ninety-four in 2012.191 While these
downward declines were occurring, median settlement size increased
from $5.6 million in 1996 to $9.3 million in 2013 (although declining to
$6.5 million in 2014, albeit after years of noticeable increases).192 This
increase in median settlement size supports the claim that plaintiffs
are more discriminating in the cases they file, focusing on suits likely
to compensate them for the costs and risks of securities class action
litigation that are cataloged below.
The high risk incident to filing a securities class action is
embodied in a single data point: the pre-trial dismissal rate of filed
suits. In 1996, a year after Congress introduced a variety of
procedural changes intended to reduce the frequency of securities
suits, forty-three securities class actions were dismissed; whereas, in
2013, in an era when many fewer securities class actions were being
filed, eighty suits were dismissed.193 Overall, as of 2014, approximately
forty-two percent of filed securities class actions were dismissed in
response to defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment.194 At the core of these trend lines is the cost curve for the
suits’ maintenance. Those costs have, not surprisingly, been impacted
by several legal, legislative, and judicial developments.
However, securities fraud class actions are ill-suited for
monitoring managerial agency costs for other reasons as well.
Doctrinally, the seeds of eviscerating the antifraud provision’s
potential to address managerial agency costs were sown in the 1960s
and 1970s when the Supreme Court sought to curb the everexpanding scope of Rule 10b-5 by ruling that it could not address
“instances of corporate mismanagement.”195 This phrase arose from
the Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.196 opinion, where the gravamen
of the complaint was that the controlling stockholder thwarted an
ongoing acquisition of the company at a premium so that he could
garner the entire control premium for himself.197 The defendant’s
191. See RENZO COMOLLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH
ASSOCS., INC., RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2014 FULLYEAR REVIEW 20 fig.17 (2015), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2015
/PUB_Full_Year_Trends_2014_0115.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RRW-9GQN]. However, in
2013, there were 102 settlements, the first increase in total settlements in years. See id.
192. See id. at 28 fig.24 (adjusted for inflation).
193. See id. at 20 fig.17.
194. See id.
195. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477, 479–80 (1977); see also 17
C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2015).
196. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
197. See id. at 462 (compelling premium received for transferring control to be
disgorged pro-rata among company stockholders).
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misconduct in Birnbaum was ultimately addressed under state law as
a breach of the controlling stockholder’s fiduciary duty.198 However,
Birnbaum reasoned that the antifraud provision reached only fraud in
connection with a plaintiff’s own purchase or sale and did not extend
to breaches of fiduciary duty by managers or controlling stockholders
absent such a connection with a plaintiff’s actual purchase or sale.199
Later, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green200
would take a similar position in holding that alleged unfairness,
absent deception, in connection with a forced sale of securities held
by minority holders was outside the scope of the antifraud
provision.201 The sine qua non for a violation of the securities laws,
therefore, is a material deception; an egregious breach of fiduciary
obligation absent deception is not within the reach of the antifraud
provision.202 Thus, with the one exception discussed below, the
antifraud provision has not just been relegated to a rear seat for
claims of fiduciary misconduct; it has not even been in the vehicle
carrying these shareholder complaints to settlement or judgment.
Despite the significant narrowing of the antifraud provision,
there has been a growing use of it to redress lapses in management
oversight.203 Given all of the obstacles that shareholders face in
bringing these cases,204 resorting to private suit under the securities
laws to address oversight situations is an indictment of the
comparative weakness of state law mechanisms to curb this variety of
managerial agency cost. As seen earlier, a state fiduciary duty claim
that the directors and officers were poor stewards must confront not
only the business judgment rule’s strong presumption of propriety but
also, more importantly, the additional protection provided the
198. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175–76 (2d. Cir. 1955).
199. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 464.
200. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
201. See id. at 473–74.
202. See id. at 474–77.
203. See Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State
Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 308–10 (2010).
204. Among the obstacles facing the securities fraud plaintiff is (1) a bar to discovery
until all pretrial motions to dismiss have been resolved, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21D(b)(3)(B) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B)(2012)); (2) a heightened pleading
standard that requires facts to be alleged with particularity that establish a strong
inference of scienter, see id. § 21D(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(2012)); (3) a
requirement that the plaintiff must set forth affirmative allegations that the alleged
misrepresentation caused an economic loss, see Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,
338 (2005); and (4) a requirement that when the transaction occurs in a public market the
plaintiff must establish features regarding the market consistent with the security’s price
likely being impacted by a material misrepresentation, see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
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board’s decision by the available immunity shield provision.205 The
effect of the immunity shield is to force the suit’s focus toward the
responsible officers rather than the outside directors.206 So focused,
the derivative suit plaintiff confronts an even greater obstacle: the
demand requirement, whereby a decision by the independent
directors that the suit is not in the corporation’s best interest scuttles
the suit. In combination, oversight failures and harmful stewardship
escape scrutiny under state law except in the extreme instances of
conscious abandonment of compliance with the law, as illustrated in
Massey.207 The vacuum created by the weakness of the state law based
derivative suit has been filled by the federal securities law antifraud
provision, even if not a perfect fit.
At first, the path for securities fraud class actions challenging
managerial oversight lapses was unclear. After Santa Fe Industries,
absent a materially misleading statement, the antifraud provision is
not violated.208 However, investors could proceed when they could
identify misrepresentations anchored in management’s failed
stewardship and the accompanying lapses in board oversight. Many of
the actionable statements are the consequence of the SEC’s
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) provision that
mandates SEC filings, among other MD&A requirements, to set forth
“any known trends or uncertainties . . . the registrant reasonably
expects will have a material . . . impact.”209
The demands of this requirement were recently strengthened by
a Second Circuit decision holding that failure to comply with the
requirement is a material omission, as the natural implication of
making a disclosure of a known trend or uncertainty is that the trend
or uncertainty does not exist.210 More generally, management,
certainly within regulated industries, proffers statements of the firm’s
205. See supra Section III.A.
206. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate
Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929 (2008) (arguing that an individual focus in duty of care
cases along with a collective focus in duty of loyalty cases sets a perfect balance between
the board’s authority and accountability).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 178–79.
208. ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he complaint must ‘specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,’ and
‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(1)–(2)); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007))).
209. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303(a)(3)(ii)).
210. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2015).
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compliance with prevailing legal requirements or offers opinions
about the firm’s business strategies and operations as it seeks to meet
the ongoing regulatory and competitive challenges that confront the
firm. These statements are attuned to well-understood investor
concerns about the effect of regulation and competition on the firm.
Investors value management’s reassurances, but these reassurances
are often tainted by over-optimism that appears to abound among
managers.211 Within this informational environment, the Supreme
Court’s most recent antifraud decision allows Rule 10b-5 to play an
expanded role in addressing failures of stewardship.
In Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborer’s District Council Construction
Industry Pension Fund,212 the Supreme Court established the template
for how management opinion statements regarding its policies,
practices, and oversight are actionable under the antifraud
provision.213 In its registration statement for a public offering of its
securities, Omnicare stated management “believe[d]” its various
contracts were “in compliance with applicable federal and state laws”
and “legally and economically valid arrangements.”214 The belief was
misplaced, as subsequent to the public offering, several federal
enforcement suits were initiated against Omnicare alleging that
multiple aspects of its contractual relationships and business
arrangements violated federal health care laws.215 Purchasers of the
registered securities thereafter initiated the class action suit and
alleged they had been misled by the false opinion of legal
compliance.216
The premise of Omnicare is that “a reasonable investor may,
depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion statement to
convey facts about how the speaker has formed the opinion . . . . [I]f
the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement
will mislead its audience.”217 Omnicare’s template analyzes
management’s opinions regarding its performance, policies, and
practices through the lens of whether the opinion expressed is a halftruth, meaning the opinion is actionable because in light of the total
circumstances management omitted facts necessary to prevent the

211. See James D. Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits
for Failures to Comply with the Law, 68 SMU L. REV. 715, 725 (2015).
212. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
213. See id. at 1323.
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 1324.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1328.
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statement from being materially misleading. This formulation is
captured by the Court’s illustration:
Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal
compliance: “We believe our conduct is lawful.” If the issuer
makes that statement without having consulted a lawyer, it
could be misleadingly incomplete. . . . [A]n investor, though
recognizing that legal opinions can prove wrong in the end, still
likely expects such an assertion to rest on some meaningful
legal inquiry . . . . Similarly, if the issuer made the statement in
the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or with knowledge that
the Federal Government was taking the opposite view, the
investor again has cause to complain: He expects not just that
the issuer believes the opinion . . . but that it fairly aligns with
the information in the issuer’s possession at the time.218
Before Omnicare, generalized statements of optimism, such as “our
conduct is lawful,” were perfunctorily viewed as harmless puffery.219
The ultimate significance of Omnicare is that the decision invites
inquiry about whether optimism professed by management is
nonetheless a half-truth.
Henceforth, whether mandated or volunteered, when executives
report on their management oversight and boards report on their
efforts and systems to monitor management’s stewardship, Omnicare
will allow potential plaintiffs to police their professed achievements.
While bad stewardship and poor monitoring will not give rise to
disciplining of such underperformance by the antifraud provision,
false representations of the strength of internal systems for assuring
board oversight and systems for promoting wise stewardship of the
firm are very much today’s subject of the securities laws. Because
Omnicare promotes greater transparency around the firm’s
information and compliance systems, greater effort within the firm is
expected to assure it is fulfilling its objective of reducing managerial
agency costs.
At a minimum, we therefore find that disclosure-oriented federal
securities suits can address errant stewardship. This can occur where
the managers proffer bold claims of their compliance with the law,
that their business strategies are yielding great returns, or that
218. Id. at 1328–29.
219. See, e.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. of Chi. v. JP Morgan Chase
Co., 553 F.3d 187, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that the company’s “risk management
processes . . . are highly disciplined” was non-actionable puffery even though the risk
processes were poorly designed to forecast systematic risk posed by home mortgages
(citation omitted)).
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existing contracts will add immensely to future profits when behind
each assertion is an ongoing violation of federal or state law that upon
detection and compliance will prove immensely unrewarding to the
firm. However, outside this realm, the most significant contribution of
private and public enforcement of the securities laws is the culture of
compliance they compel.220 Complaints abound that suits, or at least
most suits, are frivolous and drive up the cost of business transactions.
Regardless of the accuracy of this claim, it nonetheless supports a
healthy awareness of the perils of nondisclosure of material
information in securities transactions, which includes periodic reports
and other announcements that reach investors. Enforcement, public
and private, of the securities laws shines a bright light on managers.
Not only does this result in the therapeutic effect of warding some
from misbehavior, but it also alerts investors and regulators of facts
warranting inquiry and perhaps enforcement. And it is a light beamed
into an area largely vacated by state corporate law.
C.

Hedge Funds and Private Equity Firms Monitor Managerial
Oversight Failures

Hedge funds are constantly on the lookout for undervalued
target firms. Firms that suffer from significant managerial oversight
failures are likely to experience poor performance and stock price
declines that will make them targets for activist shareholders. Activist
hedge funds are more likely to seek to gain board representation at
these firms, and those that succeed in obtaining board seats will have
strong incentives to monitor target firm boards and overall firm risk
levels.221 Furthermore, as noted earlier,222 hedge funds seek to force a
sale of the target firm in many instances. The threat of hedge fund
activism is therefore likely to keep corporate management sharply
focused on any red flags that might signal systemic operational
weaknesses.
220. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:
A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2222 (2010) (arguing that private
enforcement of securities laws imposes reputational damage and thus deters bad actors).
221. We note that some hedge funds have nominated director candidates with “golden
leash” special compensation arrangements in which the hedge fund “privately offers to
compensate its nominee directors in connection with their service as a director of the
target corporation.” Jason D. Schloetzer, Activist Hedge Funds, “Golden Leash” Special
Compensation Arrangements, and Advance Notice Bylaws, DIRECTOR NOTES, December
2015, at 6, https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB-DNV7N5Activist-Hedge-Funds1.pdf&type=subsite [https://perma.cc/V23K-WQ77]. The use of
these arrangements is controversial, and no one has fully measured how often they are
employed, but it appears that they are “rather limited in practice.” Id.
222. See supra Section I.C.
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Private equity firms are another important monitor of
managerial oversight failures. For one thing, they stand ready to
purchase firms that have previously been targeted by hedge funds
because of large losses from poor managerial oversight. Should that
occur, corporate management of the newly privatized firm would be
under the strict scrutiny of a strong board of directors appointed by
the new controlling shareholder that seeks to ensure the
maximization of shareholder value so that the private equity firm
realizes substantial gains on its investment.223 The newly appointed
private equity directors are highly motivated to perform in this role
because they have increased levels of pay for performance, work in
smaller and more focused groups, and can credibly threaten dismissal
of nonperforming executives.224 As a result, it is expected that they
would exercise strong managerial oversight with all cost-justified
internal control systems deployed by the board in an effort to ensure
firm value is maximized. Thus, if private equity firms take on the
oversight function, derivative suits will be unnecessary as monitoring
devices.
Private equity firms are better risk monitors than public
company boards for other reasons as well.225 First, management team
members will have greater equity interest in their firms than their
public company counterparts, especially at the more junior levels.226
This gives them stronger incentives to care about firm value and,
therefore, to more accurately assess the impact on the firm of
increased risk levels. Second, private equity managers’ equity
interests are much more sensitive to changes in firm value because of
the magnifying effects of the relatively high debt burden shouldered
by their companies.227 This again gives them stronger incentives to
monitor risk levels. Finally, the more experienced directors that are
employed by private equity firms will have better information and
greater ability to control risk levels because they have the backing of
the control shareholder in doing so. In short, hedge funds and private

223. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 17, at 228.
224. Id. at 251–52 (noting that directors at private equity controlled firms have stronger
incentives to engage in active monitoring of managers and that “the private equity firms
typically have a dominant position on the board of directors, providing them with the
power to discipline management as well”).
225. See id. at 253–54.
226. Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance
and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 245 (1989).
227. See Dan Galai & Ronald W. Masulis, The Option Pricing Model and the Risk
Factor of Stock, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 53, 58–61 (1976).
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equity firms are filling a monitoring gap created by the shortcomings
of derivative litigation.
CONCLUSION
Derivative suits and M&A class actions have enjoyed periods of
great repute as well as tough times when they have been vilified.
Their usefulness as monitoring devices for managerial agency costs
has lately been called into question, while courts and legislatures have
cut back on the scope and long-term viability of these tools. However,
even as the strength of these forms of litigation has waned, new forms
of monitoring techniques have emerged. Hedge fund activism, Say on
Pay votes, securities fraud class actions, private equity firms, and
appraisal arbitrage have come forth to fill the gaps as potential
alternative monitoring tools for disgruntled shareholders.
In this Article, we argue that these two sets of developments are
related to malfunctions in the market for corporate control, abuses in
executive compensation practices, and breakdowns in managerial
oversight. In each case, as managerial agency costs began to spiral
upward, investors sought ways to reduce them. Hedge fund activism is
the strongest of these methods at the moment with many welldocumented successes in opening up the market for corporate
control, curbing executive compensation, and attacking a lack of
managerial oversight. Say on Pay voting requirements have served
primarily as a tool to nudge managers to engage with their
shareholders over issues related to executive compensation, a
function that derivative litigation has shown itself unable to perform.
Securities fraud class actions have shown promise as a tool for
addressing managerial oversight failures as have private equity
controlled boards of directors. Finally, appraisal arbitrage holds out
the hope of a better remedy for shareholders that are forced to sell
their stock in control shareholder squeezeouts. If the Delaware
legislature can screen out frivolous appraisal strike suits while
permitting meritorious actions to survive, then appraisal arbitrage
could provide shareholders with a means of redress when they are
forced to sell their shares too cheaply, a remedy that was largely lost
after the Delaware courts decided to apply business judgment
standard review in many such transactions.
These new governance responses are influenced by, or created
out of, the rising concentration of share ownership of public
companies. It is well documented that share ownership has steadily
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evolved so that there are now a significant number of large
blockholders at many public companies.228 This reduces the costs of
collective action and increases the likelihood that an owner exists who
will have a sufficient economic interest to embrace governance as a
wealth-increasing strategy. Hedge fund activism, appraisal arbitrage,
private equity boards of directors, and even Say on Pay are directly or
indirectly all the product of greater concentration of equity
ownership.
Looking to the future, some evidence suggests that these trends
will continue. Hedge fund activism seems to be rising to new levels in
the economy. Private equity buyouts are cyclical in nature, rising to
higher levels with good economic times but dropping off in times of
recession, and therefore reflect the strong benefits of concentrated
ownership over dispersed ownership systems. Furthermore, current
market trends in the IPO markets show that increasing numbers of
high profile firms are using dual class stock structures to preserve the
benefits of concentrated ownership for the newly public companies.229
All of these forces should lead to higher levels of ownership
concentration and managerial agency cost reductions as new forms of
shareholder monitoring develop.

228. See Holderness, supra note 12, at 1378 (presenting new evidence of the
concentration of holdings in public corporations). This activism is further facilitated by
private equity firms’ ownership consolidation.
229. See Tom Braithwaite, Tech ‘Unicorns’ Opt for Dual Share Listings, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/96a7e362-73cb-11e5-a129-3fcc4f641d98.html
#axzz4EyZwREHC [https://perma.cc/THN6-6GBC (staff-uploaded archive)]. See generally
Laura Casares Field, Control Considerations of Newly Public Firms: The Implementation
of Antitakeover Provisions and Dual Class Shares Before the IPO (Feb. 10, 1999)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=150488
[https://perma.cc/6TFV-JR6W (staff-uploaded archive)] (describing this trend among IPOs
between 1988 and 1992).
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